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Abstract
Economic reforms in India are often hailed as the march of private enterprise, 
unshackled from bureaucratic control. Though it is true that the Indian growth 
story is led by private capital, reforms have also unleashed a resurgent public 
sector in the Indian economy, with a signiﬁcant contribution to investment and 
growth in India. This article looks at the political economy of SOE reforms, their 
partial privatization and restructuring, with enhanced autonomy as the key fac-
tors that have shaped a more dynamic SOE sector, at least amongst those con-
trolled by the central government. As India moved to market-based prices and 
incentives, and better contract enforcements, central government SOEs (CSOEs) 
have substantially enhanced their proﬁtability, investments and growth. As far as 
manufacturing SOEs are concerned, their proﬁtability and efﬁciency is superior 
to private ﬁrms, while the performance of CSOEs in services has been rather poor.
Keywords: India, state-owned enterprises, economic reforms, privatization 
Introduction
The programme of reforms, economic liberalization and deregulation 
since 1991 marks a turning point in the history of modern India's eco-
nomic development. It signals a decisive shift towards a neo-liberal 
strategy of development, long advocated by multilateral institutions 
such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Whether 
this shift was a result of the conditions imposed by these institutions 
when India, confronted with the problem of acute balance of pay-
ments in 1990-91, approached them for assistance, is immaterial today. 
This is because over the period of the last two decades there has been 
strengthening of resolve by domestic lobbies that have long favoured 
deregulation and privatization.
The state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have long dominated the in-
dustrial and commercial sectors. They have experienced a chequered 
history, and today face unprecedented pressures and threats with 
dramatic changes in the business environment that in many ways 
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have few parallels in the world. Unlike China, where the private sector 
was largely absent and hence unable to inﬂuence policies that shaped 
competition, the Indian SOEs faced unprecedented pressures as the 
political economy shifted decidedly in favour of large business, largely 
controlled by business families or groups. This shift means that private 
competitors could now inﬂuence 'controllers', usually politicians and 
bureaucrats who shape policy as well as regulate and approve further 
investment and expansion of SOEs.  
This article looks at the restructuring of Indian SOEs under the new 
regime of liberalization and deregulation. It traces the shifts in policy 
over the last two decades, including the period of privatization and the 
response of the SOEs to these policy shifts. Despite the policy shift in 
favour of the private sector, there are several sectors of the economy 
where SOEs continue to play a major role driving growth and accumula-
tion. They have restructured and changed their governance structures 
along with greater autonomy granted to larger and proﬁtable units. 
In addition, the Indian SOEs, despite their declining weight in the 
economy, continue to dominate major sectors of the economy. This 
article responds to the suggestion that privatization and the resulting 
so-called 'efﬁciency' of resource use would have accelerated growth. 
We trace the important role that state-owned enterprises have played 
in accumulation and acceleration of the rate of growth in India since 
2004, along with their strategic role in acting as a countervailing force 
to private capital, both domestic and foreign. 
Planned Development and the Role of SOEs
The Public Sector in the Indian Economy
Even before India achieved its formal independence from British 
rule, the emerging political and economic elites had envisaged a 
major role for the public sector. With a weak bourgeoisie, limited 
domestic savings, a tiny capital market and a small banking sec-
tor, and a global economy disrupted by long wars, the consensus 
was that the emergent state should play a major role in fostering 
economic development and industrialization through a process of 
planning (Chattopadhyay 1987). Very early, India launched its ﬁve-
year plans, modelled on the pattern of the USSR and China, with 
emphasis on ﬁscal measures to raise resources for investment and 
state-led investment planning. 
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Thanks to this primacy given to the public sector, it soon emerged 
as the main site of investment in the economy. Due to this, the public 
sector has historically been the driver of economic growth in the Indian 
economy. From the period of the Second Five-Year Plan (1956), the public 
sector has accounted for about 45-50 per cent of gross capital formation 
(Table 1). Despite the bulk of the economy being in the private sector, 
TABLE 1: India: Savings and Gross Domestic Capital Formation
Savings and GCF as per cent of GDP at Current Market Prices (per cent) 
Year Household Sector Private Corp. Sector Public Sector Total
 Savings GCF Savings GCF Savings GCF Savings GCF
    As per cent of GDP at Current Market Price
(Base Year: 1999-2000)
1955-56 8.98 5.10 1.21 2.10 2.09 5.10 12.29 12.30
1960-61 6.53 3.91 1.61 3.29 3.07 7.23 11.21 14.43
1965-66 8.60 4.77 1.45 2.66 3.64 8.70 13.68 16.13
1970-71 9.45 6.49 1.45 2.39 3.30 6.71 14.21 15.59
1975-76 10.88 6.23 1.29 2.78 4.69 9.78 16.86 18.79
1980-81 12.88 6.96 1.61 2.65 4.00 8.94 18.49 18.55
1985-86 13.13 6.54 1.93 5.53 3.92 11.40 18.98 23.47
1990-91 18.40 9.68 2.66 4.49 1.77 9.98 22.82 24.16
1995-96 16.87 8.00 4.96 10.40 2.59 8.20 24.42 26.59
2000-01  21.64 11.40 3.86 5.19 -1.75 6.88 23.74 24.16
(Base Year: 2004-2005)
2005-06 23.17 11.80 7.49 13.47 2.42 7.91 33.08 34.30
2008-09 22.63 12.20 8.44 12.71 1.44 9.40 32.50 35.59
Savings and GCF as per cent of Total 
Year Household Sector Private Corp Sector Public Sector Total
 Savings GCF Savings GCF Savings GCF Savings GCF
    As per cent of Total 
(Base Year: 1999-2000)
1955-56 73.08 41.41 9.88 17.10 17.04 41.49 100 100
1960-61 58.20 27.07 14.40 22.77 27.41 50.12 100 100
1965-66 62.85 29.59 10.57 16.49 26.58 53.95 100 100
1970-71 66.52 41.60 10.23 15.35 23.25 43.05 100 100
1975-76 64.55 33.14 7.63 14.81 27.82 52.04 100 100
1980-81 69.66 37.51 8.70 14.30 21.64 48.19 100 100
1985-86 69.19 27.88 10.16 23.55 20.64 48.57 100 100
1990-91 80.60 40.08 11.66 18.59 7.74 41.33 100 100
1995-96 69.08 30.07 20.33 39.09 10.60 30.84 100 100
2000-01 91.15 47.17 16.24 21.46 -7.39 28.47 100 100
(Base Year: 2004-2005)
2005-06 70.04 34.41 22.63 39.27 7.33 23.06 100 100
2008-09 69.63 34.27 25.96 35.70 4.42 26.42 100 100
Source: India. 2011. Reserve Bank, Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, Mumbai
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the private corporate sector has been a minor site of accumulation. Until 
the early 1980s, the private corporate sector accounted for about 20 per 
cent of total capital formation (less than 3 per cent of GDP). Until very 
recently, the household sector (including medium and small enterprises, 
largely in the unorganized sector) accounted for 30-40 per cent of total 
Indian capital formation. 
In terms of savings, the bulk of the savings (about 70 per cent of the 
total) was provided by the household sector. This was followed by the 
public sector, while the private corporate sector provided about 10 per 
cent of the savings (approximately 2-4 per cent of GDP). 
The 1980s was a decade of growing ﬁscal crisis as the government 
began to run larger ﬁscal deﬁcits, with a signiﬁcantly large revenue 
deﬁcit by 1990. With this, 'public administration' (surplus from taxes 
after revenue expenditure was met) that provided substantial savings 
several-fold larger than 'non-departmental enterprises' (in other words, 
state-owned enterprises), now became a drain on the savings from such 
enterprises. This increasing deﬁcit of the 'public administration' was ac-
companied by growing efﬁciency and increasing savings and investment 
in the 'non-departmental enterprises' (that is, SOEs) (Table 2). 
As India embarked on its neo-liberal policies by dismantling plan-
ning and shifting to the market and private sector to propel growth, 
TABLE 2: India: Structure of National Savings at Current Prices 
(2004-2005 Series)1 
Public Sector
Year
House-
holds
Private 
Corporate
Public  
Authorities
SOEs2 Total GDS3
1955 - 1956 1,041 134 220 27 1,422
1960 - 1961 1,226 281 509 63 2,079
1965 - 1966 2,596 405 900 185 4,086
1970 - 1971 4,531 672 1220 397 6,821
1975 - 1976 9,790 1,083 3299 893 15,066
1980 - 1981 18,116 2,339 4278 1,857 26,590
1985 - 1986 36,666 5,426 3783 7,539 53,414
1990 - 1991 108,603 15,164 -6,169 16,810 134,408
1995 - 1996 198,585 59,153 -6,493 38,019 289,265
2000 - 2001 463,750 81,062 -90,644 61,377 515,545
2005 - 2006 868,988 277,208 -58,279 147,234 1,235,151
2010 - 2011 1,749,311 602,464 -99,212 229,367 2,481,931
Notes: 1 In crores (1 crore = Rs. 10 million); 2 SOEs are referred to as 'non-departmental enter-
prises' in the original resource; 3 GDS = Gross Domestic Savings
Source: CSO, National Accounts Series, as reproduced in EPW Research Foundation, National 
Income Database. 
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the Indian state embarked on a policy of lowering tax rates, cutting 
subsidies and reducing investment in sectors reserved for the public 
sector, while facilitating the entry of the private sector into such areas. It 
has also encouraged opening up the ﬁnancial sector and capital market 
to global investors, thus ending the public sector's monopoly over the 
ﬁnancing of private enterprises.
As a result, the rate of growth of the private corporate sector has 
accelerated since the policy of liberalization began in 1991. By 1995, 
the private sector had overtaken both the public sector as well as the 
household sector in terms of investment and capital formation. This 
expansion in the private corporate sector's share has been entirely at 
the expense of the public sector, where capital formation has fallen 
from 49 per cent of total investment to about 25 per cent (Table 1). Not 
only has the private sector emerged as an important driver of increas-
ing accumulation, its savings, too, have shown a sharp increase in the 
last ten years. These have jumped from about 3.5 per cent of GDP to 
8-9 per cent of GDP. 
State-Owned Enterprises in Indian Development
To understand why and how the SOEs in India play such a signiﬁcant 
leading role, it is important to recall the Indian industrialization strat-
egy since the 1950s. It was the Industrial Policy Resolution (1956) that 
reserved the commanding heights of the economy for state enterprises. 
Though the private sector was allowed to play its role and private 
property was protected by the Constitution, the areas opened to it 
for investment were limited. Since the time of India's independence 
in 1947, enterprises in public utilities and infrastructure, including 
the railways, ports, airports and telecommunication and power units 
had largely been in the public sector. The Industrial Policy Resolution 
even earmarked several basic and capital good sectors exclusively for 
the public sector. In fact, the private enterprises already in existence in 
these sectors (reserved for SOEs) could continue only with the state's 
permission and were to be gradually nationalized. However, the bulk 
of consumer goods sectors of the economy, as well as production of 
several intermediate goods such as cement, were opened to the private 
sector.
The key role assigned to the SOEs in the industrialization strategy 
was to help India achieve economic self-reliance. The basic objectives 
of the enterprises were: 1) to build infrastructure for economic devel-
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opment and promote industrialization; 2) to promote employment 
and balanced regional development; 3) to create a self-reliant economy 
through import substitution and develop the capacity to export; 4) to 
generate surpluses for development by earning suitable returns; and 5) 
to prevent concentration of private economic power.
At the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan (1952), the country had 
only ﬁve SOEs, with a total investment of 290 million rupees (Rs.) (ap-
proximately US$60 million, at the 1955 exchange rate). By the Second 
Five-Year Plan, which coincided with the announcement of the Industrial 
Policy of 1956, a spate of new SOEs was being established in several 
core and basic industries. Units producing steel, heavy engineering, 
fertiliser, electricity generation equipment, machine tools, etc. were set 
up, several of them with technological and ﬁnancial assistance of the 
Soviet Union and other East European countries. Subsequently, in the 
1970s, the government nationalized the coal industry, large commercial 
banks and all insurance companies. It also took over several ﬁrms in 
the private sector that were facing bankruptcy and had closed down or 
were on the verge of closure.
Though the most signiﬁcant SOEs were established by the central 
(federal) government (referred to hereafter as CSOEs),  a large number 
of enterprises were established by state (provincial) governments 
(SSOEs), including many in the joint sector where the private partners 
held up to 49 per cent of the shares. A few units were even established 
by municipalities or jointly by state and central governments.
In the 1990s (at the end of the Seventh Five-Year Plan), when the Indian 
government launched the programme of deregulation and liberalization, 
the number of CSOEs had increased to 244 (excluding the commercial 
banks and insurance companies), up from ﬁve units four decades be-
fore. By 2005-2006, these had declined to 239 due to the disinvestment 
and privatization of a few leading CSOEs by the government led by the 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). 
By the early 1990s, many key sectors of the economy were dominated 
by mature public enterprises that had successfully expanded produc-
tion, opened up new areas of technology, and substituted imports in 
an array of capital goods sectors, with technical competence that en-
hanced India's ranking in terms of industrialization, with a large pool 
of trained workers, along with technical skills, especially in chemical 
and manufacturing industries.
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Deregulation and Liberalization and the Changing Role 
of SOEs
In the 1990s, as the policy of liberalization and deregulation gathered 
pace, along with policies to promote increasing integration of the Indian 
economy with the global economy, SOEs were robbed of their historic 
role. A new industrial policy was announced on 24 July 1991, which 
opened up most sectors of the economy to private entry and investment. 
Simultaneously, foreign investment was welcomed. Foreign-owned en-
terprises could now hold 51 per cent or more in the enterprises set up in 
the country. Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) were allowed to invest 
in Indian stock exchanges and restrictions on mergers and acquisitions 
were abolished. The new industrial policy announced that the exclusive 
role of the public sector was to be limited to a few strategic sectors. 
With the shift in the public policy towards liberalization and deregu-
lation, the business environment of Indian SOEs underwent a radical 
change. The most signiﬁcant of these changes are: 
a) Free entry to private sector ﬁrms in industries reserved exclusively 
for SOEs. The most signiﬁcant of industries affected by this policy 
were telecommunications, petroleum (from extraction to reﬁning 
and marketing), electricity generation and distribution, several 
basic goods industries like steel, aluminium, etc., mining and air 
transportation.
b) Disinvestment of a small part of the government's shareholding 
(while still holding majority stocks) and listing SOEs on the stock 
exchanges.
c) Ensuring that the listed SOEs follow the stock exchanges' listing 
requirements including disclosure and governance regulations, 
appointment of independent directors, independent remuneration 
and audit committees, etc.
d) Withholding or withdrawing budgetary support to loss-making 
('sick') SOEs. Subsequently, sick SOEs were denied permission to 
revise wages and salaries.
e) Loss-making SOEs were to be encouraged to lay off workers to seek 
commercial viability, failing which, they were to be closed down or 
privatized. 
The radical shift in public policy was based on an ideological shift 
towards market-based reforms and neo-liberal ideology. The clamour 
for large-scale privatization from foreign investors and several Indian 
and foreign advisors became pronounced. Privatization was not directly 
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stated in the government policy announcement, but was more clearly 
articulated by the advisers appointed by the Indian government (see 
India 1993; Bhagwati & Srinivasan 1993; and Bhandari & Goswami 
2000). SOEs were assumed to be 'immensely inefﬁcient'. These advis-
ers also called for renouncing the creation of new SOEs in areas where 
private sectors were willing to invest. Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1993), 
however, insisted that the sale of fractional equity on the stock exchange 
did not adequately signal to SOE managers that they should improve 
their efﬁciency and productivity and they favoured 'privatization that 
transfers control and management to the private sector' (Bhagawati & 
Srinivasan 1993: 50). 
The advice of the World Bank (Seabright 1993) and neo-liberal econo-
mists (Bhagawati & Srinivasan 1993; Bhandari & Goswami 2000) was 
to restructure the SOEs with the aim of complete privatization. Yet 
the actual evolution of the policy faced opposition and resistance and 
took many years. The policy of complete privatization was carried out 
only when a change in the government brought the right-wing BJP to 
power. 
The sudden shift in the public policy and the business environment 
of state enterprises had the potential to undermine the proﬁtability and 
economic viability of most enterprises. It was widely believed that the 
SOEs were inefﬁcient and used resources badly and subjecting them to 
market forces and competition would help in restructuring them. With 
adequate support from the government and the help of the National Re-
newal Fund established with the assistance of the World Bank, it would 
help minimize the human cost of SOE restructuring. The government 
encouraged all the SOEs, but especially the loss-making enterprises, to 
reduce their workforce wherever possible through a scheme of 'volun-
tary retirement'. It is estimated that approximately half a million workers 
were forced to leave.1
The reforms of the public sector have gone through three distinct 
phases (Dhameja 2006), reﬂecting the changing political coalitions and 
underlying political economy.
First Phase of Reforms (1992-1998)  Here the Congress Party government 
embarked on a policy of divesting up to 20 per cent of shares to mutual 
funds (fractional equity sale), the general public and workers. From 1993-
1994, foreign institutional investors (FIIs) were also allowed to bid for 
shares. However, despite the recommendation of the Rangarajan Com-
mittee (India1993) to divest up to 74 per cent of shares in non-strategic 
areas, only one CSOE was privatized, the automobile company Maruti 
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was sold to the Japanese partner Suzuki. Few CSOEs were sold to other 
SOEs in the same sector. Thus, the petroleum marketing company IBP 
was sold to IOC Ltd. (both CSOEs), which has a dominant position in 
the petroleum reﬁning and marketing sector. 
Along with the new industrial policy, the government decided to 
review the portfolio of investment by SOEs, with the view to focus on 
enterprises in strategic, high-technology sectors and on essential infra-
structure. Moreover, restrictions on the private sector in areas that so 
far had been exclusively reserved for state investment were withdrawn. 
Simultaneously, the SOEs were also to be allowed to enter any sector 
that was not earlier reserved for it.
In addition, the government announced that SOEs that were chronically 
sick and could not be turned around were to be referred to the Board 
for Industrial and Financial Restructuring (BIFR) or similar high-level 
institutions to be created for this purpose. A social security mecha-
nism to protect the interest of workers likely to be retrenched or laid 
off was to be developed. The government also announced that to raise 
resources as well as encourage wider public participation, a part of the 
government's shareholding in SOEs was to be offered to mutual funds, 
ﬁnancial institutions, workers and the public at large. 
The boards of the SOEs were to be made more professional and given 
greater powers. Soon the government announced a list of companies, 
which were designated as 'Nav Ratnas' ('New Jewels'), where the com-
pany board would have substantially enhanced powers to undertake 
investments, acquire assets and companies in India and abroad and enjoy 
greater autonomy. Such enterprises were usually the better managed 
and more proﬁtable ones, often with a dominant position in a sector or 
a branch of industries. Over the years, the list of such enterprises was 
expanded with graded levels of autonomy.2
Second Phase of Reforms (1998-2004) The government was now headed by 
a coalition led by the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party, which decided 
on large-scale privatization or strategic sale of a controlling stake to pri-
vate parties as well as to better performing SOEs. In all, a dozen SOEs 
were privatized during this period and in two cases the government 
controlling block was sold to other SOEs in the same sector. The govern-
ment realized a total of Rs. 63.5 billion from such strategic sales. Amongst 
the major SOEs privatized were Indian Petro-chemicals Limited, VSNL, 
which had a monopoly on long-distance telecommunications trafﬁc and 
was the largest provider of internet services, Bharat Aluminium, along 
with 18 hotels run by the Indian Tourism Development Corporation. In 
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addition, the government stake of 4.5 per cent in the Gas Authority of 
India Ltd. was sold to ONGC and IOC, both of which were large and 
cash-rich SOEs in the petroleum sector
Third Phase of Reforms (2004-2010) Once again the government was led 
by the Congress Party and until 2009 the government depended on the 
communist parties for support. During this period, privatization was 
discontinued. Under pressure from the communist parties and trade 
unions, the government agreed to make serious efforts to revive the 
underperforming or 'sick' CSOEs. It appointed a Board for Reconstruc-
tion of Public Sector Enterprises (BRPSE) with a mandate to undertake 
ﬁnancial restructuring and revival of sick SOEs. During this period, 
BRPSE recommended restructuring 60 SOEs, the closure of two and the 
strategic sale of two other enterprises. 
In 1997, the Disinvestment Commission pronounced that the govern-
ment had failed to provide a 'level playing ﬁeld' to SOEs. It stated that 
though the private sector had been granted full freedom to enter any 
industry, add capacities, enter sectors hitherto reserved for SOEs (such 
as telecommunications, generation and distribution of electricity, petro-
leum extraction and reﬁning), the public sector faced several handicaps 
while competing against the private enterprises. The Commission felt 
that despite the promise of greater autonomy to SOEs in the policy 
statements, they still had to obtain multi-level and time-consuming 
approval for decisions and were accountable to multiple agencies with 
varying mandates. 'This lack of autonomy has created a somewhat un-
equal playing ﬁeld for the PSUs (SOEs) in an increasingly competitive 
environment' (India 1997: 7).  
In response to these criticisms, as well as the reversal of the BJP's pri-
vatization programme,  the Congress Party-led government appointed 
in 2004 a committee under Arjun Sengupta to look at ways of granting 
'full managerial and commercial autonomy' to central government 
SOEs, with a view to enhancing their ability to respond to market-based 
competition from private sector ﬁrms. The committee recommended 
sweeping changes in the relationship between the controlling ministry 
and the SOEs, since it felt that the ministries' numerous and detailed 
interventions in routine operations of SOEs was a serious erosion of 
their autonomy to carry out business. It wanted all major decisions, 
both strategic and operational, to be under the control of the board of 
directors, where at least half of the board members would be independ-
ent directors. In case a ministry wanted to issue any instructions to an 
SOE, it should issue a 'Presidential Decree', which would require the 
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approval of the entire cabinet. It also sought to insulate SOEs from 'Par-
liamentary interference' that could require SOEs to reveal commercially 
sensitive information that could help its private sector competitors. It 
recommended a 'negative list' where the government would have no say, 
including decisions on pricing, distribution, import/export, appoint-
ment of dealers and agents and promotion of employees. The powers 
of Nav Ratnas to set up joint ventures or invest were to be enhanced. In 
addition, it recommended sector-speciﬁc supervisory bodies to review 
the performance of SOEs (India 2005). 
Despite the break with the communist parties in 2009 and the forma-
tion of a new Congress-led coalition government, the policy of privati-
zation has not been resumed. The government continues to sell small 
amounts of shares in the SOEs listed on the stock exchange, with a view 
to raise resources to bridge the government's rising deﬁcit. In recent 
years, it has also asked SOEs to increase the rate of dividend.  
 To sum up, despite strident demands from many economists and mul-
tilateral institutions, the Indian government has found it difﬁcult to carry 
out any further privatization or strategic sale of CSOEs. However, some 
SSOEs (SOEs owned by provincial governments) have been sold in some 
states. The central government, however, has continued its policy of selling 
shares held by the government in enterprises to mutual funds, ﬁnancial 
institutions, workers and the public at large, but the sales (of fractional 
equity) have not resulted in change of control or privatization
Restructuring and Reconstitution of the CSOEs and 
SOEs after Reforms
Why did the successive governments in India fail to undertake large-
scale privatization? Why did the BJP government fail to carry out its 
mandate to sell all SOEs in all industries except units in the defence and 
the atomic energy sectors as the Disinvestment Commission had sug-
gested? We turn to the political economy of the reforms programme. 
First, though the successive governments espoused their commitment 
to the reforms and privatization, there is overwhelming evidence that 
the majority of voters were opposed to the economic reforms in general 
and privatization in particular.3 Second, the governments that carried 
out these reforms faced resistance from trade unions and middle class 
consumers, who were afraid of increased prices of goods, services, etc. 
Third, successive governments were defeated in elections (India had ﬁve 
governments during the 1991-1999 period), forcing the political parties 
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to be wary of the electoral costs of large-scale privatization. Fourth, 
several cases of privatization in India by the BJP invited sharp criticism, 
especially when assets sold by the government were re-sold by the 
acquiring parties at substantially higher prices. There were allegations 
of large-scale corruption and the sale of valuable assets at low prices. 
Lastly, given the large weight of SOEs in industrial assets and sales, 
large-scale privatization could result in economic dislocation, jeopard-
izing growth. Indeed, as it became clear to the political establishment 
that privatization was fraught with high risk, a new role for SOEs began 
to be envisaged. This was also possible due to signiﬁcant changes in the 
governance structures and autonomy to managers, as well as substantial 
improvement in the proﬁts and growth by SOEs. 
India in the New Millennium: Accumulation, Growth 
and State-Owned Enterprises
According to the neo-liberal folklore, India's arrival in the international 
arena as a rapidly growing economy has been entirely due to liberaliza-
tion of the economy and space provided to the private sector to expand. 
The 'animal spirits' it unleashed, and the institutional reforms that aided 
accumulation and competition, helped private capital, so long leashed 
by regulation, to lead the economy. In their view, the inefﬁciency of the 
state-owned enterprises and the resources they wasted were partly re-
sponsible for India's poor growth and investment record. The unﬁnished 
agenda, according to this folklore, is to further dismantle and dismember 
the public sector, especially the SOEs (Bhagawati & Srinivasan 1993; 
Bhandari & Goswami 2000). 
This folklore ignores the signiﬁcant role played by SOEs in India's 
emergence as a successful and growing economy. To examine the role 
of the SOEs in the Indian economy, we need to review their impact on 
the goals that the Indian elite set for itself: namely, to accelerate the rate 
of investment and growth to double digits and to imitate, if not exceed, 
China's record. What has been the contribution of SOEs to the key props 
of this growth acceleration? Are they relatively inefﬁcient as compared 
to the private sector enterprises, with lower productivity and returns 
on capital employed? 
Section 1 above has shown us that the public sector as a whole had 
substantially reduced its investment in the economy. Is this true of 
CSOEs too? What role have SOEs performed in the accelerating invest-
ment and accumulation in India? We see from Table 3 that the CSOEs 
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have signiﬁcantly enhanced their internal dividends, most which go to 
the central government. Has this increased payout sapped their capac-
ity to invest?
 We begin with a stylized overview of the SOEs in India. For this 
we use data from National Account Statistics (NAS) for savings and 
investment. The data on CSOEs is collected and provided annually 
by the Department of Public Enterprises in Public Enterprise Surveys. 
The 'Non-Departmental Undertakings', which we call SOEs here, are 
registered as 'companies' under the (Indian) Companies Act and fol-
low similar disclosure and accounting practices as the private ﬁrms.4 
This provides for the possibility of a comparison of the performance of 
'companies' by ownership, for which databases that provide data on 
all companies registered under the Companies Act, whether listed or 
unlisted on stock exchanges, are useful. We use data from the Prowess 
database maintained by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy 
(CMIE) for a comparative analysis. 
Like China, SOEs in India are controlled by the central (federal) gov-
ernment (CSOEs) and by the state (provincial) governments (SSOEs), 
with few controlled by city municipalities. The SOEs controlled by 
the provincial (state) government, called SSOEs here, are controlled 
by respective provincial (state) governments. However, though there 
are about 838 SSOEs with investment above Rs. 2.7 trillion (compared 
to only 249 CSOEs with investment of Rs. 9 trillion), their role in the 
growth story (with the exception of a few states) has been marginal 
(India 2007a). Two thirds of the investment of SSOEs is concentrated in 
electricity generation and distribution, with the rest spread unevenly 
in manufacturing, ﬁnance and infrastructure (India 2007a). The politi-
cal economy of electricity pricing, with subsidized or free electricity to 
farmers and other favoured sections, with no clear budgetary support 
for these, has undermined SSOEs and their viability. 
Figure 1 shows the relative share of SSOEs and CSOEs based not 
on Public Enterprise Surveys, but on the Prowess database. Of the 
total SOEs in the Prowess database, CSOEs (controlled by the central 
government) have a dominant share. As Figure 1 shows, about 80-90 
per cent of all SOE assets are accounted for by the 217 CSOEs. The 
SOEs controlled by the state (provincial) governments, have a small 
though increasing share. Part of the reason for the small decline in 
CSOEs' share (from 90 per cent to about 80 per cent) is due to the pri-
vatization of a few large SOEs by the BJP-headed government during 
the 2000-2003 period.
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The SOEs, though incorporated as companies, until 1990 were largely 
not listed on stock exchanges and the entire equity of most SOEs was 
held by central or state governments.5 As they are all registered under 
the Companies Act, or similar statutes (e.g., state electricity boards), all 
the CSOEs and SSOEs are part of what is called the 'corporate sector'. 
As mentioned, although a few SOEs were privatized by the BJP 
government, the majority have remained in the public sector. Thanks 
to the governance reforms in the public sector and greater commercial 
autonomy to most enterprises, the better-performing CSOEs today 
enjoy greater autonomy, are listed on the Indian stock exchanges and 
have independent directors on board. Have these changes made any 
difference to their efﬁciency, productivity, their growth and expansion 
or their role in the economy?
To answer this, it is important to analyze the actual performance and 
the changing and enhanced role of SOEs in the economy. The public 
sector has historically been the driver of economic growth in the Indian 
economy. From the period of the Second Five-Year Plan (1956), the 
public sector has accounted for about 45-50 per cent of gross capital 
formation (Table 1). 
Section 1 above and Tables 1 and 2 reﬂect the changes in the Indian 
savings and investment ratios during the last two decades. The recent 
acceleration of the economic growth rates in India—from about 6 per 
cent per annum during 1992-2003 to about 8-10 per cent recently—are 
largely explained by rising domestic savings and investment (Mohanty 
FIGURE 1: Relative Size of Central and State SOES
Source: Our analysis from Prowess Database, from Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), 
Sept. 2011
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& Reddy 2010). The domestic savings and investment rate rose from 
about 18-20 per cent in the 1980s to about 22-25 per cent in the 1990s 
and further, to about 33-35 per cent, since 2004. Over the entire period 
of deregulation and reforms (1991-2010), foreign savings or FDI have 
played a minor role.6 
The CSOEs have an important role in the economy, and despite 
opening up most sectors to private players, most industrial CSOEs have 
continued their growth and expansion. Contrary to the conclusion of 
declining savings and investment, at least the CSOEs have improved 
their performance and increased their rate of investment. The decline is 
entirely due to sharp reduction in savings by 'public authorities', whose 
large dis-savings have eroded the contribution of SOEs. 
The key feature of the new regime beginning in 1991 has been the 
expansion of the capital markets and associated accumulation in the 
private corporate sector. Though SOEs, too, have begun to tap the ex-
panding bond and equity markets, by and large, the sale of their equity 
has been to generate revenue for the central government. What is more, 
with increasing proﬁtability of SOEs, a large part of the accelerating 
investment also has been largely internally ﬁnanced. 
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FIGURE 2: Manufacturing Assets by Ownership Group (in Rs. crore)
Notes: BGA = Business Groups; MNC= Foreign Owned ; NGA = Private Independent Firms; NRI 
= Non Resident Indians; SOE = State Owned Enterprises; 1 Crore = 10 Million rupees
Source: Our analysis from Prowess Database, from Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy
Using the data from the Prowess database, Figures 2 and 3 show the 
assets controlled by different ownership groups in Indian manufacturing 
and services (other than ﬁnancial companies). The ownership groups 
we have chosen are the SOEs (both controlled by central and state (pro-
vincial) governments), while the private sector is divided into business 
groups (BGAs) or families whose conglomerates dominate the Indian 
private sector, non-family-controlled independent ﬁrms (NGA) and the 
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foreign-controlled ﬁrms (MNC and NRI), divided into ﬁrms controlled 
by multinational companies and non-resident Indians. 
It is clear from the two ﬁgures that SOEs in India have kept pace with 
the accumulation and investment in the private corporate sector, both 
in the manufacturing as well as the services sector. Their share of total 
assets has changed only marginally until the recent period. We could 
conclude that they have played an important if not the pivotal role in 
the expansion of investment and output. 
In the manufacturing sector, the SOEs' assets exceeded all other groups 
up to 2006, when the large business groups overtook the SOEs in terms 
of total assets controlled by them. What is more signiﬁcant, despite a 
government decision to reduce budgetary support to CSOEs, the SOEs 
continued accumulation at a faster pace than before. This was partly 
due to increasing savings and investment rates in the economy, espe-
cially from 2000-2001, and increasing savings of the SOEs from internal 
resources (see Table 3 above). 
However, Figure 2 shows that since 2007, assets controlled by Indian 
business groups (BGA) have accelerated and overtaken the total assets 
of SOEs. This we suspect is due to several large acquisitions by a few 
Indian business groups abroad. Thus, the Tatas acquired Corus Steel 
in a deal valued at US$ 12 billion, and acquired Jaguar and Daewoo's 
commercial vehicle business, besides acquisitions in Indonesia and South 
Africa in steel and mines. Similarly, large-scale acquisitions have been 
made in aluminium by the Aditya Birla group, in coal and minerals 
by the Vedanta and Adani groups, and in telecommunications by the 
Bharati group. Since 2007, the outward FDI from India has matched or 
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exceeded inward FDI. This may have altered the balance between SOEs 
and business groups. 
However, if the assets controlled by SOEs are inefﬁciently used, as 
many economists argue, (see Bhagwati & Srinvasan 1993; Bhandari & 
Goswami 2000; Seabright 1993), the SOEs may actually be a drag on the 
Indian economy. In the absence of SOEs or their full-scale privatization, 
the rate of growth as well as accumulation may have been faster!
In order to answer this argument, we need to address the issue of 
efﬁciency of resource use by SOEs, vis-a-vis private sector ﬁrms. Since 
CSOEs represent the bulk of SOEs' investment and are the main players 
in the Indian economy, we focus the following analysis only on them. 
The ﬁrst thing to note is that the number of such enterprises is miniscule 
(only 217) compared to several thousand SOEs in China. Secondly, they 
are limited in their scope and conﬁned largely to the sectors reserved 
for them by the Industrial Policy of 1956.Thirdly, about one fourth of 
CSOEs constitute sick private sector ﬁrms that were abandoned by 
their private owners, and were subsequently nationalized to protect 
jobs and investment. 
Table 3 above, using data from Public Enterprise Surveys (PES)7 
shows the proﬁle of central government SOEs during the last 10 years. 
As can be seen from the table, the number of loss-making enterprises 
has fallen from 110 to 55-58 and their losses have been contained at Rs. 
12-14 billion. This is largely due to the ﬁnancial restructuring carried out 
at the recommendation of the Board for Reconstruction of Public Sector 
Enterprises and strengthening of their management teams. 
The proﬁt-making CSOEs have shown exemplary performance dur-
ing this decade. While their capital employed has jumped 274 per cent 
(from Rs. 3,313 billion to Rs. 9,088 billion) their proﬁts after tax have 
risen by 380 per cent (from Rs. 284 billion to Rs. 1,084 billion) and their 
dividends by 402 per cent (from Rs. 82 billion to Rs. 332 billion). What 
is more signiﬁcant, the retained proﬁts have increased by 827 per cent 
(from Rs. 65 billion to Rs. 542 billion) (Table 3). These proﬁts are despite 
the price controls on several commodities manufactured and sold by 
CSOEs, the most signiﬁcant of which are the petroleum reﬁning and 
marketing companies. The government has not allowed the CSOEs in 
the petroleum sector to increase prices of petrol, LPG and diesel in line 
with the increase in the price of crude oil. Similarly, prices of fertilisers 
manufactured by CSOEs have been controlled to provide subsidized 
inputs to farmers. All these populist price controls have substantially 
lowered the combined proﬁts of CSOEs.
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To answer the questions about their efﬁciency and use of resources, 
we need to compare their performance with those of the private sector. 
We leave out the state-owned banks and ﬁnancial services ﬁrms, which 
have been separately studied by several scholars, the most well known 
being the study by Ram Mohan (2005).
 For a comparison of private and state-owned enterprises, we use 
data from the Prowess database, which covers the entire corporate 
sector (including CSOEs, SSOEs and private sector ﬁrms). From Prow-
ess, we have estimated the change in assets as a proxy for investment 
(presented in Figure 4). As Figure 4 shows, all SOEs (including SSOEs 
controlled by provincial governments) contributed about 30 to 70 per 
cent of all corporate sector investment in the economy during the last 
decade. This was during a period when the overall investment rate in 
the economy rose from 25 per cent to 35-37 per cent. 
To compare the efﬁciency of private and public sector ﬁrms, we have 
used the Prowess data, with some ﬁltering. The Prowess database has data 
on 13,019 ﬁrms in the manufacturing private sector and 234 SOE ﬁrms in 
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FIGURE 4: Share of Corporate Sector Investment by Ownership 
Group
Source: Our estimates from CMIE Prowess Database
the manufacturing public sector. Similarly, it has data on 6,759 ﬁrms in 
the services private sector and 118 SOE ﬁrms in the services public sector. 
For our analysis, we selected ﬁrms with a total income over Rs. 1 billion. 
Moreover, we ignored ﬁrms where one or more data point was missing. 
Longitudinal data covering a 20-year period (1991-2011) was collected. 
As the Prowess database has added new ﬁrms over the years, the number 
of ﬁrms with sales of more than Rs. 1 billion each year varies.8 
As the Figures 5 and 6 clearly show, with reforms and empowered 
boards, manufacturing CSOEs with sales of above Rs. 1 billion (US$25 
million), substantially improved their performance and through market-
driven pricing were able to match the private sector's return on capital 
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by the second half of the 1990s. Thereafter, their performance has been 
superior to private ﬁrms in resource use. As Figure 6 shows, only the 
foreign-owned private ﬁrms enjoy returns that are close to (but lower 
than) those of CSOEs. Other segments of private ﬁrms, namely Indian-
owned independent ﬁrms (NGA) and business group-controlled ﬁrms 
(BGA) had far lower returns. 
The picture in the services sector is different. Service sector CSOEs 
had lower returns on capital employed, and with pricing reforms and 
cuts in subsidies, were able to raise their proﬁtability to levels equal to 
the private sector by the turn of the century. However, SOEs such as 
Air India and the telecom ﬁrm BSNL, have found it difﬁcult to meet the 
competition or shed workers (for example, BSNL has 100,000 employ-
ees that are estimated as 'surplus') and are incurring large losses. Both 
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FIGURE 6: Return on Capital Employed (by Ownership Group)
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these industries have seen excess supply and hyper-competition, with 
declining prices, which has eroded their ability to respond. Large losses 
in the airline and telecommunication sectors after 2004 have lowered 
the return for the group as a whole.
In addition, we must keep in mind that several CSOEs in the services 
sector are actually promotional ﬁrms, such as the Tourism Development 
Corporation and the North East Export Promotion Corporation. They 
are meant to develop infrastructure to crowd in private investment or 
to help small ﬁrms access markets and resources. 
Thus, there is no conclusive proof that CSOEs are grossly inefﬁcient 
and unproﬁtable. With reforms aimed at strengthening autonomy and 
decision making, the manufacturing SOEs actually out-perform the 
private sector ﬁrms. Several CSOEs are now listed and have emerged 
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as champions on the Indian stock exchanges and account for 25-30 per 
cent of market capitalization of the entire Indian capital market. They 
also enjoy excellent credit ratings in the global bond markets and have 
several large foreign institutions as their important investors. 
Conclusion
Economic reforms and shifts in public policy towards market-based 
reforms and an end to protection and reservations provided to SOEs, 
along with the imminent threat of privatization, have posed serious 
challenges to SOEs in India. Increasing competition and the entry of 
the private sector in most industries reserved for SOEs, along with 
liberal imports, provided the impetus for reform and the shift in their 
corporate strategy. 
Opposition to full-scale privatization shifted the government's strat-
egy from using SOEs to generate resources to demanding enhanced 
dividends and listing them on the stock markets, with small sales of 
equity. On the other hand, the government agreed to provide them with 
greater autonomy and improve corporate governance by changing the 
composition of their boards and enhancing the powers of these boards 
for investment and strategic decisions. Though these reforms were 
limited to better-performing SOEs, they partially changed the relation-
ship between the ministries and the enterprises. Simultaneously, under 
pressure from the communist parties, on whose support the Congress 
Party government was dependent, limited restructuring of sick SOEs 
was carried out. It helped about 40 sick enterprises to emerge as proﬁt-
able and competitive units.
But the SOEs' major role has been in supporting and expanding the indus-
trial base in the country. SOEs account for about 30 per cent of all corporate 
sector investment. They have kept pace with the increasing investment rate. 
The CSOEs, which are controlled by the central government, account for 
about 7 per cent of total gross capital formation in India. 
During the last decade, the rate of proﬁtability of SOEs has doubled 
and in the manufacturing sector is now superior to private sector en-
terprises. In services, their performance has been poorer, which can be 
largely attributed to losses in airline and land-line telecommunication 
ﬁrms. They account for a signiﬁcant share of the market capitalization 
on the National Stock Exchange. 
The recent surge in GDP growth rates in India is largely explained by 
the increasing investment. Though the central government has found 
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it difﬁcult to maintain its historical share in total investment due to its 
rising ﬁscal deﬁcits, the CSOEs have not only maintained their share, 
but marginally increased it.
This is quite like the picture in China, where the SOEs have been the 
major site of investment and accumulation. However, unlike in China, 
the Indian SOEs face a policy environment that assumes that private 
capital is more efﬁcient and where a large private sector is able to suc-
cessfully inﬂuence public policy in its favour, sometimes through lob-
bies and on other occasions through direct bribes. The scandals in the 
telecom sector under investigation are a potent example.
Sushil Khanna is Professor of Economics and Strategic Management at the 
Indian Institute of Management Calcutta. His areas of research interest 
include: India's economic reforms and transformation, public sector, corporate 
governance and global expansion of Indian ﬁrms.
NOTES
1  The Voluntary Retirement Scheme in Indian SOEs was entirely voluntary. If em-
ployees refused to accept the severance package and continued their employment 
contract, they would be retrenched. However, the salaries and wages in loss-making 
SOEs were not revised. Many skilled workers, who could ﬁnd jobs in the private 
sector, left the SOEs.
2 By 2008 there were ﬁve 'Maha-Ratnas' (Great Jewels) with power to invest up to Rs. 
50 billion, 16 'Nav Ratnas' (New Jewels) with power to invest up to Rs. 25 billion, 
and 66 'Mini-Ratnas' (Small Jewels) with lower powers. See Indian Department of 
Public Enterprises website at http://dpe.nic.in/newsite/navmini.htm.
3  For example, in February 2003, a speaker from the global consulting ﬁrm Deloitte 
noted a 'growing political opposition to privatization in emerging markets due to 
widespread perception that it does not serve the interests of the population at large', 
which it attributed to a number of features of privatization: 'Pressures to increase 
tariffs and cut off non-payers; loss of jobs of vocal union members that will be hard 
to retrain; [and] the perception that only special interests are served—privatization 
is seen as serving oligarchic domestic and foreign interests that proﬁt at the expense 
of the country . . .'. (Hall, Lobina & de la Motte 2005: 287-288). India was part of the 
survey.
4  This is in contrast to China, where company law and corporatization of SOEs is a 
recent phenomenon, since 1994.
5  Few private companies that were nationalized did have small private equity held 
by individuals, and insurance companies. 
6  Since 2005, the inﬂow of foreign investment has accelerated and the current account 
deﬁcit has widened to between 2 and 3 per cent of GDP, reﬂecting greater reliance 
on foreign savings.
7  The Public Enterprise Surveys (PES) data excludes any data or comparison with 
privately owned enterprises. 
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8   The number of ﬁrms used for analysis varies as shown in the table below:
Year 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011
Manufacturing
Private 65 141 223 383 439
Public 14 37 37 43 42
Services
Private 23 99 210 413 495
Public 14 23 33 42 35
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